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Grief: Putting the Past before Us
Michael R. Kelly
Department of Philosophy, University of San Diego
Abstract*
Grief  research in philosophy agrees that one who grieves grieves over the 
irreversible loss of  someone whom the griever loved deeply, and that some-
one thus factored centrally into the griever’s sense of  purpose and meaning 
in the world. The analytic literature in general tends to focus its treatments on 
the paradigm case of  grief  as the death of  a loved one. I want to restrict my 
account to the paradigm case because the paradigm case most persuades the 
mind that grief  is a past- directed emotion. The phenomenological move I 
propose will enable us to (1) respect the paradigm case of  grief  and a broader 
but still legitimate set of  grief- generating states of  affairs, (2) liberate grief  
from the view that grief  is past directed or about the past, and thus (3) ac-
count for grief  in a way that separates it from its closest emotion- neighbor, 
sorrow, without having to rely on the affective quality of  those two emotions.
If  the passing of  the beloved causes the grief  but is not what the 
grief  is about, then we can get at the nature of  grief  by saying its tempo-
ral orientation is in the past (the event of  the passing), but its temporal 
meaning is the present and future— the new signifi cance of  a world with 
the pervasive absence that is the world without the beloved. The no- longer 
of  grief  is a no- longer oriented by a past (that which is no longer) that is 
referred a present and future (that which is a no- longer understood as not 
now as it once was). Looking at the griever’s relation to time can tell us 
much about the pain and the object of  grief, then. As the griever puts the 
past before himself  with a certainty about this world “henceforth,” a look 
at the griever’s lived sense of  the fi nality of  the irreversibly lost (1) liberates 
grief  from the tendency in the literature to be reduced to a past- directed 
emotion, (2) accounts for grief ’s intensity, its affective force or poignancy, 
 * Many thanks to my friends and colleagues who offered helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of  this paper: Craig Agule, Chris Arroyo, Michele Averchi, Harriett 
Baber, Steven Crowell, John Drummond, Tyler Hower, Turner Nevitt, Nick Riggle, 
Matthew Shockey, Jeff  Yoshimi, and Matt Zwolinski.
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and thus (3) enables us to separate grief  from sorrow according to its inten-
tional object in light of  the temporal meaning of  these emotions.
Keywords: Husserl, grief, sorrow, phenomenology, absence, emotion, 
memory, future
What is a griever’s relation to time? What can this tell us about the pain and the 
object of  the emotion of  grief? Despite what some may consider continental 
philosophy’s obsession with lived- experience and time (and even perhaps a mor-
bid preoccupation with death) we have to look to analytic philosophy to fi nd 
a small but sustained literature on grief. Grief  theorists might include William 
Lyons, Donald Gustafson, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Roberts, Robert Solo-
mon, and Carolyn Price.1 These researchers agree that one who grieves grieves 
over the irreversible loss of  someone whom the griever loved deeply and that 
someone thus factored centrally into the griever’s sense of  purpose and mean-
ing in the world. The analytic literature in general tends to focus its treatments 
on the paradigm case of  grief  as the death of  a loved one with the exception of  
Solomon, who admits “treasured objects” or objects of  profound sentimental 
value for the agent suffering the loss.2 If  we wish to describe the experience 
of  grieving, we should not restrict the loss to which grief  responds to a loss of  
that which one possessed (especially a person) and thereby presuppose what we 
intend to describe.3
A good account of  grief  should accommodate a range of  states of  
affairs that extends to the loss of  all things we deeply desired, even if  
we never possessed them or even if  our relation fundamentally changes 
though the thing remains. To the loss of  persons or treasured objects 
 1 Carolyn Price mentions this list in her essay, “The Rationality of  Grief,” Inquiry 
53, no. 1 (2010): 20– 40.
 2 Robert C. Solomon, In Defense of  Sentimentality (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 80. Henceforth cited parenthetically as S.
 3 Solomon claims “grief  has its measure . . . the right amount of  grief  speaks well of  
a person and his or her caring about others. Too little or too much grief  points to a less 
than virtuous personality, either callous and uncaring or hysterical and overly dependent. 
(In either case, narcissism is often a plausible candidate as an explanation.) Thus we might 
say, as Aristotle did not, that grief  is a genuine virtue” (86). Solomon derides people who 
grieved the death of  princess Dianna. While one might want to claim that an adult should 
not grieve the passing of  a pet goldfi sh while a young child could grieve such a loss with-
out reproach, the experience of  grief  is grief  even when the griever is perhaps out of  line 
for grieving about X or grieving too vehemently or too lengthily or not vehemently or 
lengthily enough about some legitimate grief  generating state of  affairs. Questions of  fi t 
and warrant are secondary issues, however, for the grieving agent is grieving whether or 
not philosophers would not accept what the griever deems a serious loss.
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admitted by the analytic literature we could add the following sample of  
life events that demarcate (sometimes positive) changes where some-
thing of  oneself  or something for oneself  is lost irrecoverably, irrevers-
ibly: Graduation from high school or university causes grief  of  loss of  
childhood; the teenager can grieve the lost puppy- love and the jilted or 
divorced lover grieves the loss of  the relationship even though the former 
partner is still alive; the athlete holding back tears during the retirement 
press conference grieves the loss of  his primary passion and source of  
identity; anyone retiring from any career or losing a once in a lifetime 
opportunity can grieve over that which for various reasons will not and 
cannot again present itself  (e.g., 1986, Shea Stadium, game 6, world series, 
Bill Buckner); as the Disney/Pixar fi lm, Up, reminds us (beyond the loss 
of  a spouse) great grief  even can follow from something that seems to be 
either a miscarriage or the news of  infertility and the loss of  the possibility 
of  having children, and so forth.
Nevertheless, I want to restrict my account to the paradigm case, because 
it is the paradigm account that I think most persuades the mind that grief  
is a past- directed emotion. Moreover, the analytic literature makes a proto- 
phenomenological appeal to the effects of  grief  against which I would like to 
contrast my account. The phenomenological move I propose will enable us 
to (1) respect the paradigm case of  grief  and a broader but still legitimate set 
of  grief  generating states of  affairs, (2) liberate grief  from the view that grief  
is past directed or about the past, and thus (3) account for grief  in a way that 
separates it from its closest emotion- neighbor, sorrow, without having to rely 
on the affective quality of  those two emotions.
I do not want to dispute the claim of  the past as a necessary fea-
ture of  grief  or that grief  certainly can refer to the past; grievers char-
acteristically dwell in the past with their memories or wishes, and on 
fi rst impression this gives grief  the reputation of  being past- directed. 
The irreversible, irrevocable, unalterable loss of  someone that one loved 
deeply certainly causes grief. But, developing a distinction introduced by 
Anthony Steinbock’s recent work, Moral Emotions, I want to claim that 
while the past event or the event of  the beloved’s passing marks grief ’s 
temporal orientation, the temporal meaning or signifi cance of  grief, how-
ever, is not about the past.4
Steinbock carries this distinction throughout his work. I shall use it to carve 
out something like the difference between an event in objective time, on the 
one hand, and the subjective apprehension of  that event, on the other hand— 
that is, temporal orientation and temporal meaning, respectively. Insofar as 
 4 Anthony J. Steinbock, Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of  the Heart (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014), 15.
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this is the case, I take this distinction itself  to build on the notion introduced 
by Husserl that the modes of  time- consciousness are not themselves temporal 
but modes of  appearance5 and, as such, make it possible that, as Brough nicely 
glosses Husserl, “what the fl ow of  time takes away . . . the consciousness of  
time restores.”6 While the level of  absolute time- constituting consciousness 
will not factor into my account of  grief, it forms the basis from which the 
meaning of  grief, for the griever, can yield an account of  the pain of  grieving 
and the object of  grief, understood according to the way that griever takes 
(intends) time with respect to the beloved’s passing.
The temporal meaning of  grief, I shall argue, is about the henceforth— 
this absence forward from that past event, the event of  the passing, that 
causes grief. If  the passing of  the beloved causes the grief  but is not what 
the grief  is about, then we can get at the nature of  grief  by saying its tem-
poral orientation is in the past (the event of  the passing), but its temporal 
meaning is the present and future— the new signifi cance of  a world with 
the pervasive absence that is the world without the beloved. The no- longer 
of  grief  is a no- longer oriented by a past (that which is no longer) that is 
referred a present and future (that which is a no- longer understood as not 
now as it once was).7 Looking at the griever’s relation to time can tell us 
much about the pain and the object of  grief, then. As the griever puts the 
past before himself  with a certainty about this world henceforth, a look at 
the griever’s lived sense of  the fi nality of  the irreversibly lost (1) liberates 
grief  from the tendency in the literature to be reduced to a past- directed 
emotion, (2) accounts for grief ’s intensity, its affective force or poignancy, 
and thus (3) enables us to separate grief  from sorrow according to its 
intentional object in light of  the temporal meaning of  these emotions.8
 5 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of  the Consciousness of  Internal Time 
(1893— 1917), translated by J. B. Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 
333/345.
 6 J. B. Brough, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Husserl, The Phenomenology of  the 
Consciousness of  Internal Time, xxiii.
 7 Though the past is always no longer (e.g., it is no longer Wednesday on Thurs-
day), the “no longer” is not always merely the past, for some “no longers” are a 
henceforth, for example, “I no longer love you,” “we no longer offer happy hour,” “I 
can no longer play basketball competitively,” or “John is no longer with us” (whether 
he has moved onto a new company or a new dimension).
 8 I hope it is clear that my appeal to the temporality of  grieving does not entail 
the familiar psychological notion of  the stages of  grief  as they unfold over time and 
as grief  manifests differently across such stages. My account describes how the griever 
intends the world after the death of  his beloved and the way in which the world ap-
pears to that griever. Focused on the intentional structure of  grief  in light of  its tem-
poral modes, my account likewise differs from Peter Goldie’s account of  the narrative 
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Before beginning these analyses, I want to make one clarifi cation. 
A reader might already note with normative concern that the proposed 
account of  the intentional structure of  grief  according to its temporality 
may seem excessively self- absorbed. That is an understandable concern 
for which I ask the reader’s indulgence. Grief  certainly entails the loss of  
the other in the paradigm case and a good account of  grief  should not 
lose the other or even put the lost beloved too far to the margin of  the 
experience. But grief  is necessarily self- involved. She is gone and I remain 
and I miss her and all of  this affects my well- being, precisely because my 
well- being was so profoundly and intimately bound up with her and her 
meaning to and for my life. To the extent that her loss affects my well- 
being, I hope the reader can see that the other factors deeply into the 
account that I shall present, for she fashioned me in profound, meaning-
ful, and irreplaceably singular ways.9
structure of  grief. Goldie mentions the future dimension of  grieving, which I shall 
quote just now, but he does not focus on that moment as it relates to the essence of  
grief, choosing instead an account that, as I see it, philosophically ratifi es the psy-
chological stages: “now remembers it as the last time she saw her husband, walking 
around the corner with hanging shoulders, so that, because of  what she now knows, 
the memory of  that day is itself  infused with the portent of  the terrible future that the 
earlier experience did not have. In this way, autobiographical narrative thinking can 
reveal or express both one’s internal and external perspective on one’s tragic loss, so 
that these two perspectives are intertwined through the psychological correlate of  free 
indirect style. Grief  is indeed replete with memories. But grief  involves not just mem-
ories of  particular experiences; it also involves memories of  general events, and these 
can be especially poignant given that the remembered general event can no longer be 
experienced as it used to be. For example, you remember those holidays in France 
together, and the trips to the beach with the rest of  the family, knowing now that 
they cannot be repeated as they used to be. Or you remember the general event of  
his coming home from the offi ce as he usually does, knowing now that he no longer 
will, for this time, this particular remembered time, unlike all the others, is the last time. 
Now, just this kind of  thinking is highly characteristic of  narrative thinking about 
grief, whether one’s own grief  or that of  another person. Grief  is a kind of  pattern 
that, as I mentioned earlier, takes a characteristic shape, and accordingly the capacity 
of  narratives to incorporate and make sense of  general events is especially important 
here. . . . The narrative of  a grieving will thus reveal how the pattern of  grief  unfolded 
over time in a characteristic way.” The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, Mind (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 66.
 9 Thanks to Jeff  Yoshimi for pushing me to admit, explain, and defend this fea-
ture of  the account I am suggesting. This does not address all of  his good concerns, 
but, here, I think I am close to Martha Nussbaum’s account of  eudaimonistic ac-
counts of  emotions and of  grief  in particular, in Upheavals of  Thought (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). On pages 44 and 52, she writes of  grief  and the 
emotions in general: “Internal to grief  itself  must be the perception of  the beloved 
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Toward a Phenomenology of Grief in the Analytic Literature
Three features characterize the analytic literature on grief. First, analytic 
thinkers usually take grief  as an intense and painful experience of  irrevocable 
loss the paradigm case of  which is the death of  a loved one. Second, these 
thinkers largely refl ect the ordinary belief  that grief  is a past- directed emo-
tion focused on the lost loved one. Third, such philosophers usually engage 
in a vibrant debate about the rationality or irrationality of  grief, the con-
clusion to which depends on whether or not the philosopher construes the 
grieving agent as desiring or merely wishing that the beloved had not died. 
The distinction between a desire and a wish on the grounds that the former 
is stronger than the latter seems to save grief ’s rationality. But Gustafson, 
himself  an analytic philosopher, claims that this move runs afoul with the 
need to distinguish grief  from sorrow. Although the belief/wish distinction is 
widely accepted in the grief  literature, it does not save grief  from irrationality 
but sets it apart from sorrow in its irrationality, insofar as sorrow and grief  
differ in their intensity or feeling or what it feels like to grieve or have sorrow.
Gustafson, whose work advances the established paradigm case of  grief  
as the response to the death of  a loved one, sets up grief ’s irrationality this 
way: “grief  is irrational in this respect. . . . S knows and believes that N is 
dead. S has feelings of  loss, pain, anger, and the like at the loss of  N. And 
importantly, S desires that it not be the case that N is dead. . . . Thus, S’s desire 
is inherently irrational, in that it is recognizably unsatisfi able . . . on S’s own 
understanding of  it.”10 Other grief  theorists accept the assumption regarding 
the rationality of  desires that guides the claim about grief ’s irrationality. But 
they reject the assumption that a griever in fact desires something that cannot 
be achieved— that is, the deceased’s resurrection or that the deceased not be 
deceased. The griever, they propose, merely wishes that things were different. 
Robert Roberts, for instance, offers the following tempered version of  the 
griever’s desire in his defi ning proposition, “X to whom (which) I was (am) 
deeply attached and who (which) is irreplaceable, has been irrevocably taken 
from me; would that X could be restored to me.”11 On Robert’s view, the 
object and of  her importance. . . . [The] most important thing . . . that lies deep in 
ancient eudaimonism but that is never explicitly recognized[:] Emotions contain an 
ineliminable reference to me, to the fact that it is my scheme of  goals and projects. . . . 
It is not just the fact that Betty Craven has died. It is the fact that Betty Craven is 
my mother. In short, the evaluations associated with emotions are evaluations from my 
perceptive . . . they contain an ineliminable reference to the self.”
 10 D. Gustafson, “Grief,” Nous 23, no. 4 (1989): 457– 79, esp. 464; quote from 
466. Henceforth cited parenthetically as G.
 11 R. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in the Aid of  Moral Psychology (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2003), 263.
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grieving agent seems resigned to the facts and yet, because of  his profound 
love, wishes that things were otherwise— “would that it were so.”
Carolyn Price’s somewhat recent contribution to the analytic grief  liter-
ature recognizes that Gustafson anticipated the objections to grief ’s irratio-
nality, the alternatives to grief ’s supposed irrationality based on a distinction 
between desiring and wishing, and the problem with these alternatives.12 
Gustafson argues that the desire/wish distinction may blur the lines between 
sorrowing and grieving. In instances where the lover may be said to desire 
the restoration of  the deceased spouse and, for example, the brother of  the 
lover may be said to wish for the restoration of  the deceased, Gustafson 
notes that “desiring that not- P in the face of  P’s recognized truth and wishing 
the same are . . . indistinguishable with respect to minimal truth conditions” 
(G, 473). Both intentional states take the same object, and when they do 
desiring and wishing that the deceased not be deceased amounts to the same 
“belief  contrary desire” (G, 473).
Gustafson’s search for a clear account of  grief  that can establish its 
difference from sorrow (granting the assumption that the wish/desire dis-
tinction cannot do so) brings him to a proto- phenomenology of  grieving 
and sorrowing. He appeals, that is, to the affective dimension of  grief  and 
sorrow— “what it feels like”— or the subjective, felt experience of  these 
emotions. He thus concludes, “Obviously, the distinction [between grief  and 
sorrow] has to be in experience rather than the objects of  these attitudes or 
in the accompanying action. And surely this is where the difference lies. What 
it is like to longingly want something that is not attainable is not what it is 
like . . . to wish that the world were other than it is. The intensity of  feelings, 
depth of  despair over the loss of  hope, the global character of  the feelings 
of  pain over the fact which occasions the attitudes are all among differences” 
(G, 473). Price concurs and cites as further “evidence” Robert Solomon’s 
claim that “One might wish that someone had not died and feel sorrow for 
the loss, but grief  involves the turmoil of  an impossible desire . . . and the 
persistent demand that it not be so” (S, 85). For Price, “it is hard to see how 
a wish, no matter how fervent, could generate an intense distress and restless 
searching characteristic of  grief.”13
This seems intuitively correct, but such a conclusion is not so obvious 
and surely is not where the explanatory or phenomenological difference lies. 
The appeal to a proto- phenomenological feel seems meant to establish that 
grief ’s desire for the impossible will be more agonizing than sorrow’s wish 
for the same impossibility. But we cannot pry grief  apart from sorrowing 
according to its affects or felt experience. Analytic and phenomenological 
 12 C. Price, “The Rationality of  Grief,” 23.
 13 Ibid., 24.
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authors alike (for example, Daniel Farell and John Drummond) agree that 
the same emotion in different agents can appear across different affective 
conditions and that the same emotion in the same agent at different times 
can produce different affective conditions.14 Moreover, the appeal to affects 
seems to leave unaddressed an account of  what motivates these supposedly 
more or less intense affects in grief  and sorrow, respectively. I take issue with 
Gustafson’s claim that “the facts which occasion the attitudes are all among 
the difference,” and think the depth of  commitment to the deceased condi-
tions the agent’s reaction and ensuing desire or wish that she not be deceased. 
If  that assertion is true, it not only has the benefi t of  mitigating the worry 
that accounts of  grief  are overly self- regarding or overly self- concerned. But 
it also implies that any distinction between these emotions falls back upon 
the depth of  commitment to that which has been lost, and not the ensuing 
desire or wish with its more or less intense feeling about the deceased, for 
the depth of  commitment produces the attitude of  desire or wish. An inter-
esting impasse thus arises in the analytic treatment of  grief: analytic accounts 
of  emotions tend to clarify the emotions conceptually in light of  the objects 
they intend or, less frequently, according to their affects, but both approaches 
fail for different reasons.
To provide an account of  grief  that can pull it apart from sorrow, I want 
to suggest a different phenomenological move that starts from a realization 
that the cause and the object of  grief  are not the same. Just as my Suzie’s 
affection for James causes James to become the object of  my jealousy, the 
passing of  my beloved (to stick with the paradigm case of  grief) causes, but 
is not the object of, my grief, since her absence is the object I intend when 
I grieve (it is her as lost). The move I propose would consider how grief  
and sorrow relate to the passing of  the beloved and how grief  takes a more 
global object— specifi ed according to its temporal signifi cance in the present 
and the future— not found in sorrow (in the case where grief  and sorrow 
react to the loss of  someone). I am proposing what we might call the tem-
porality of  grieving or, how the griever takes the experience temporally. How 
this person’s passing affects the meaning of  time conditions the affects as 
those of  grieving or sorrowing. What we shall see is that sorrow, unlike grief, 
need not put the past before itself  in the present and the future. There is a 
sense in which the belief  that I shall never see her again is sad for some but 
disruptive and disorienting for others (e.g., the griever). The past will pass 
for the one who feels sorrow over the deceased; the one who feels sorrow 
will feel it now for what has occurred. The griever, however, puts the past 
 14 D. Farrell, “Jealousy,” Philosophical Review 89, no. 4 (1908): 527– 59; J. Drum-
mond, “Feelings, Emotions, and Perceiving the Truly Valuable,” Modern Schoolman 86, 
nos. 3– 4 (2009): 363– 79.
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before himself, sees the loss of  his beloved as a henceforth in a swath of  
absence that pervades a new world in which this past now conditions, limits, 
and fundamentally reorients the griever’s present and future. The difference 
between grief  and sorrow is phenomenological; namely, it has to do with 
how the griever takes the present and future in light of  the event of  the 
passing or the way the present and the future appear to the griever. The dif-
ference between grief  and sorrow is not located merely in the “feeling” or 
“what it is like” (although typically we can expect the difference in intensity 
to which Gustafson appeals); rather, it is located in the temporal meaning 
of  these responses as conditioned by the depth of  the agent’s commitments 
to the lost beloved. The object that grief  and sorrow intend in these similar 
instances will be viewed quite differently based on the temporal meaning of  
that absence for the agent and this difference will explain the different affec-
tive intensities of  grief  and sorrow.
As these grief  theorists do not take the temporality of  grieving into 
account, they ultimately focus on the loss and on the past and conclude that 
grief  is “characteristically focused on the past rather than the future.”15 The 
most phenomenological of  these authors, Robert Solomon, seems more 
inclined to commit or reduce grief  to the past. He writes, “It is obvious 
that grief  is suffering brought about by the recognition of  loss . . . Grief  
is dominated by the idea that someone, the beloved, is no longer there. He 
or she is missing. Grief  is noticing, painfully, that he or she is not there. Thus 
the phenomenology of  grief  is almost inconceivable without a phenome-
nology of  memory because, to say the obvious, grief  refers the present to 
the past, the past remembered” (S, 80). But I think things are the other way 
around with grief. Grief  refers the past to the present and the future, rather than 
the present to the past. After all, in grief, I experience what has been lost as a 
loss in the present and a loss that I cannot recoup henceforth in this life (in 
the future). Solomon, perhaps in a way that justifi es rather than suspends 
the natural attitude, seems to prop up the folk psychological attitude in his 
description of  grief  and its referral to or focus upon the past. While it is 
trivially true and, as Solomon admits, exceptionally obvious to say that grief  
depends upon the past, it is equally obvious to say that grief  is not about the 
past. We capture the poignancy of  grief— its intense distress and restless 
searching— according to its regard for the present and the future in light of  
the fi nality of  the beloved’s passing. The griever sees in the present and the 
future a swath of  absence as conditioned by how he construes the temporal 
meaning of  this past event (that is the event of  this passing) as a world no 
longer with X henceforth— hopelessly and irreversibly— and thus feels pain 
in the present.
 15 C. Price, “The Rationality of  Grief,” 36.
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From one way of  looking at the grief  theorists, their accounts gesture 
beyond the affective quality of  grief  (as a way to separate it from sorrow in 
certain instances) toward a different phenomenological dimension when they 
offer descriptions of  grief  that would move accounts of  grief  beyond the 
tendency to categorize grief  as past- directed.16 Of  what I have just called 
the temporality of  grieving, Price gestures toward an account of  grief ’s pres-
ent and future temporal meaning as she highlights the “searching charac-
teristic of  grief ” along with the “longing” characteristic that she seems to 
accept from Gustafson’s description of  the feeling of  grief  or what it is 
like to grieve. Robert’s defi ning proposition reveals the temporal meaning 
of  grief  as the present insofar as grief  refers to “the X to whom (which) I 
was (am) deeply attached.” And Gustafson’s own description of  the intensity 
of  grief  implies a certain way in which the griever discloses the future— as 
a “depth of  despair over the loss of  hope”— and a certain way in which the 
griever disclose the present— according to grief ’s “global character” of  pain 
in his experience of  the loss. The global character is spatiotemporally global, 
as I shall unpack in the next section. It is because of  this present and future 
sense of  the world as no- longer with X, because of  the event of  the passing, 
that the spatiotemporal apprehension of  the absence in the present will arise 
with its poignancy. The temporal meaning of  grief  is present and future 
conditioned by its temporal orientation in the event of  the passing and thus 
painful in the present.
Time and the Object of Grief: 
Liberating Grief from Past- Directedness
We can rethink grief ’s relation to the past without losing its relation to the 
past. Sticking to the paradigm case, an event of  the death of  the beloved 
must have occurred and come to pass. There is obviously no grief  without a 
memory of  the lost beloved someone or something. I cannot grieve if  I do 
not recognize and appreciate deeply the one lost. I certainly must remember 
X and the world with X in it in order to contrast it with the world that now 
and henceforth appears as a world with X absent that I surely now evalu-
ate as painful, defi cient, and unlikable. But Solomon’s platitudinous remark, 
that grief  “refers the present to the past, the past remembered,” creates two 
problems. First, it suggests that the object of  grief  is in the past somehow, in 
the memories; second, this account of  the intentional directedness of  grief  
 16 One might say that the very concern with paradoxical desire of  grief  that 
wants to have the loss “repaired,” “restored,” or “resurrected” points to the futural 
character of  grief— though that is not quite what I have in mind below.
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seems to apply this dependence on the past to any perceptual, evaluative, 
judicative act in the present. I will treat these in order.
The confusion that generates the belief  that grief  refers the present to 
the past— the past remembered— perhaps stems from the colloquial equa-
tion of  the past with the “no longer” and the future with the “not yet.” But 
from the vantage point of  the new present that is for the griever the world 
as a world that no longer has X in it, a world henceforth no longer with X, 
it seems that the temporal meaning of  the “no longer” here is in the present 
and the future, even if  the temporal orientation of  the “no longer” is (in) the 
past. The no longer that is understood as the past is the cause or temporal 
orientation of  the grief  that is about the “no longer” as a henceforth never 
again— the not now as formerly. For the griever, the signifi cance of  X “no 
longer” being in this world is a view of  the present and future as no longer 
offering what the world once did. It is not the memories that grief  conjures 
of  the beloved, but the way grief  intends the present and the future regard-
ing the loved and lost someone that triggers the memories. In short, the 
memories are not what grief  is about; grief  is not past- directed. The act of  
memory characteristic of  the behaviors of  grievers reveals but one expres-
sion of  grief, and I will return in the next section to consider further reasons 
why grief  should not be understood in a way that gives too much weight to 
its behavior or its temporal orientation in the past.
This idea that grief  refers the present to the past— the past remembered— 
not only misleads about the object of  grief  but presents a condition of  grief  
that is much too broad. Here is a way to consider a “referring of  the present 
to the past” that has nothing to do with grief: To decide between the two beers 
that I’m considering with my dinner requires that I retain the fl avor profi les of  
each in accordance with the time in which the sips occur one before the other 
in the extended present that is my evaluation of  them alongside that of  my 
entrée. Here is another “referring of  the present to the past” that has nothing 
to do with grief: To say that you look tired today requires that I remember 
what you look like typically, or yesterday and in days past.17 These examples 
demonstrate that loads of  experiences are incomprehensible without memory 
and that referring the present to the past and the past remembered are two 
quite different intentional acts. The fi rst example is a past within a full, unfold-
ing present and is not an act of  memory; the second example, which mirrors 
the structure of  grief ’s past orientation as Solomon presents it, requires an act 
of  memory in order to compare the present and the past (more precisely an 
act of  recollection).18 To make this point differently, in the living- present that 
 17 Robert Sokolowski, “The Method of  Philosophy: Making Distinctions,” 
Review of  Metaphysics 51, no. 3 (1998): 515– 32.
 18 Husserl, On the Phenomenology of  the Consciousness of  Internal Time, no. 50.
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is the hearing of  the end of  a sentence, the passive act of  retention withholds 
from the past, with a different temporal index, those past moments of  the 
sentence related to the present that are the end of  the sentence in the com-
plete process of  hearing the sentence. Referring in the present to my college 
graduation, on the other hand, the act of  memory takes the past as remem-
bered, revives a now no longer, a former now, with a different temporal index 
that refers in the present to a past as a past now remembered. If  we want to 
get a clearer account of  the phenomenon of  grief, we cannot reduce grief  to 
the past— the past remembered— and we cannot, in turn, reduce the phenom-
enon of  absence in grief  to the past.19
If, in grieving, I get out of  my memories and face the world in which X 
is no longer, I see an absence of  a different kind— an absence not reducible 
to or about the past but caused by the past. If  the griever is looking around 
his home, for example, he may see X’s belongings henceforth as, to use from 
Nussbaum’s moving description of  the death of  her mother, “strange relics 
that seemed to me not to belong in the world anymore, as if  they should 
have vanished with her life.”20 Assuming she is referring to a book, that book 
appears as strange, because it appears henceforth as without its owner. In a 
phenomenological sense, it is less that the book should have vanished when 
Nussbaum’s mother passed away and more that that book as Mom’s- book 
has vanished and now appears as the corpse of  a book or a mere corporeal 
object that appears without (the) meaning or signifi cance (Mom’s- book). To 
the griever, the book presents the absence; that was Mom’s book but is not 
now and never will be again. What appears is an absence in the present and 
henceforth as a void, an emptiness, a hole in the world, an absence that is a 
real phenomenon, a phenomenon of  absence in this now and henceforth 
that is as real as a hole in one’s sock, which is nothing (but really quite some-
thing).21 Due to Mom’s now permanent absence, the griever now sees that 
absence— her absence— throughout the world or globally (for at least as long 
as he or she grieves).
This does not mean that grief  is a mood, for grief  takes as its object the 
absence of  the deceased. The absence is the phenomenon or object of  grief. 
 19 In remembering, I revive a formerly perceived or lived- through event. I bring 
the past to life again and transcend the here and now. I see that person and myself  
in a different temporal index and hence as past from the here and now. I make the 
absent present again in its absence and in a way that respects its absence as absence 
with its appropriate temporal index. See Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenol-
ogy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 5.
 20 M. Nussbaum, Upheavals of  Thought, 20.
 21 I have to thank Brian Davies for this example of  the hole in the sock that he 
uses in a very different discussion to illustrate the notion of  evil as a privation of  
goodness.
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There are spatial absences, for instance, she is not here in the chair in which 
she used to sit each night, which is of  course also a temporal absence in the 
now. But there are also equally, if  not more poignant, moments of  temporal 
absence that say that she will no longer— never again— sit in that chair. And 
that temporal absence, the meaning of  which is future oriented, generates the 
pain of  grief  in the present, for she is not just missing but lost— henceforth. 
Contrary to Solomon and the seemingly standard view of  the intentional 
directedness of  grieving, grief  refers the past to the present and the future— 
puts the past before us— and not the other way around. It is the realization 
that the person is lost now, henceforth, that makes for grief ’s poignancy, and 
we can work out this idea by contrasting the mode of  absence most appro-
priate to grief— that is, the mode of  the lost— with other modes of  absence.
Grief ’s Object and Temporal Meaning: 
Putting the Past before Us as Present
Turning sometimes toward grief ’s temporality, Solomon claims that the 
griever notices the loved someone or something as “missing . . . noticing, pain-
fully, that he or she is not there . . . [an] absence . . . more poignant, noticeable, 
than any presence” (S, 80). Here is a spatiotemporal sense of  the meaning 
of  grief  in the present. Yet Solomon’s poeticizing leaves vague an important 
phenomenological difference between two modes of  absence— the missing 
and the lost— that we can distinguish according to their temporal meaning. 
The difference is in the (evidence) of  the things themselves (in their being 
and the way they give themselves) as lost or missing. That is, things that are 
missing and things that are lost give themselves differently, appear differently.
We can start by noting that we miss “missing things” differently than we 
miss “lost things,” because things that are lost can be said to be missed but 
things that are missing cannot (at least not yet) be said to be lost. An agent 
that regards someone or something as missing or lost regards the present 
or future differently according to the way the missing and the lost manifest 
the present and future. A modality of  uncertainty characterizes the absence 
of  the missing but not the absence of  the lost. Sticking to the paradigm 
case of  grief, the lost denotes an absence of  someone or something once 
possessed but now no- longer and henceforth never again can be possessed, 
whereas the missing denotes the possessed now out of  my possession but 
that perhaps could be found or had once more. Something once possessed 
but now declared missing is not defi nitively and irrecoverably absent; taking 
something as missing implies the possibility, or reasonable hope of  recovery 
that discloses how the missing refers in the present to a future viewed as 
attainable, which can motivate further searching.
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That absence (which the agent declares as lost in the paradigm case of  
grief) reveals that lost someone as no longer attainable or recoverable. The 
lost refers the past to a present and to a non- realizable future because the lost 
is hopelessly locked by and in the past. The lost puts the past before us in the 
present with a very different meaning about the future than does the missing. 
The dead are gone, lost, henceforth never to return, so we should resist Sol-
omon’s poetical but imprecise view that “grief  is dominated by the idea that 
someone, the beloved, is no longer there . . . is missing” (S, 80). Undoubtedly, 
the griever misses the deceased beloved but the deceased is not missing but 
lost. As Roberts notes, to “miss someone is also to construe oneself  and 
one’s surroundings as characterized by the absence of  that object of  attach-
ment and to do so with some discomfort. . . . One wants to ‘see’ the . . . 
beloved and the desire often motivates action.”22 No absence taken as a (case 
of  something) missing is an absence taken as a (case of  something) lost in 
the way that the death of  the beloved is.23 The missing person or thing is 
absent from my present situation but may in some future be present again— 
and the temporal meaning of  the missing entails in the present an attitude 
of  openness to possibility, which is a view of  the future that motivates one 
in the present to search. The temporal meaning of  the missing implies an 
attitude of  hope in the present for a return in the future. Seeking implies 
in the present the hope that grief  cannot accommodate (in this life).
The person who sorrows may miss the deceased but it will not result 
in the grief  that says she is lost to me. The temporal meaning of  grief, as 
present and future, is not a searching for the missing. And it is not a sor-
rowing, although it is an agonizing. Grief  is a reaction to that which is no 
longer being that which is irrevocably lost. The griever apprehends the loss 
as it concerns how he must live now and henceforth, from this fundamental 
point of  reorientation occasioned by the past (the event of  the passing), but 
not about the past. Indeed, the poignancy of  grief— its affective intensity— 
is the henceforth that is the realization not that she is now missing but that 
she is lost, gone, irrevocably. The temporal meaning of  grief, in relation to 
the lost, is agonizing in the present because there is no hope in the future. 
In sorrow, regarding the death of  another, we do not hope for a future in 
this life when we might see them again, because our commitment to them 
was not of  this type— namely, they did not factor directly into my well- being 
as bound up with them. The temporal meaning conditions the affects that 
disclose the evaluation of  the deceased (lost) such that they are less intense 
in sorrow than in grief. As grief  puts the past before us, what grief  is about 
 22 R. Roberts, Emotions, 263.
 23 Though I grant obvious cases of  missing persons surely causing grief, I am 
trying to stick to the paradigm case of  grief.
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and what produces its intensity and poignancy, is the fi nality of  the absence 
of  the beloved henceforth.
Solomon sometimes describes the temporal meaning of  grief  as this 
henceforth, when he describes grief  as “noticing, painfully, that he or she 
is not there. . . . An absence can be more poignant, more noticeable . . . 
than any presence” (S, 80). This view of  grief  reveals how grief  puts 
the past before us, but it does so in a way that not only restricts that 
which is before us to the here and now but also obscures the difference 
between the modes of  absence in the missing and the lost.24 What con-
ditions the poignancy of  this absence, and characterizes the emotional 
response to it as grief  or sorrow, depends on whether the agent (1) con-
strues the absence as missing or lost, with the relation to the future that 
those notions entail, and (2) how the agent, if  he construes that absence 
as lost, relates to the lost, regarding whether or not that loss bears on 
the future for the emotional agent, which is, in turn, conditioned by 
(3) the depth of  commitment one has to the deceased who is lost— if  
there is no profound attachment to the lost, then that absence does not 
bear on the agent’s future, and vice versa, thus, contrary to Gustafson’s 
claim, setting a difference between sorrow and grief, respectively, accord-
ing to their objects.25
 24 Rather than pursuing the various manners of  absence characteristic of  the 
phenomenon of  grief  in how the grieving apprehends the world— for here his claim 
identifi es a now, a present, the phenomenological correlate of  which is the spatial/
physical absence— Solomon loses the present and futural temporal meaning of  grief  
by collapsing the absent into the past when he concludes, “Thus the phenomenology 
of  grief  is almost inconceivable without a phenomenology of  memory” (S, 80). The 
absence in sorrow or grief  over the missing or lost is certainly more poignant and 
noticeable than some presence.
 25 One might sorrow over the missing with the same temporal orientation as 
one grieves over the lost and perhaps with the same affective intensity but not the 
same sense of  the future. (As a half- thought, this may be why the sorrow of  home- 
sickness may have the affective intensity or poignancy of  the loss of  a family pet but 
not that of  a family member.) There was a past event that resulted in an absence in 
the present. How I am committed to or attached to seeking the absent determines 
its temporal meaning of  my relation to the missing as sorrowful in the present 
and yet as hopeful in the future, which suggests an absence by which I am less 
profoundly affected or something about which I may be sorry but not profoundly 
affected. The intensity of  affect in grief  or sorrow differ insofar as the view of  the 
present and the future differs in each. In this instance, the sorrow is motivated by 
and oriented in the past moment that is the loss of  the now missing (beloved) but it 
need not come with a sense of  an irrevocable loss and indeed the temporal meaning 
relating to the missing refers to the present in discomfort yet toward the future with 
a hope or optimism.
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Grief  entails the past to the extent that the event of  the passing is its 
temporal orientation. For example, she is no longer, but her being no longer 
means for me a no longer henceforth— an impossibility of  the “we” as I go 
forward. Grief  does not intend the past except as an expression of  grief  in 
the act of  memory.26 The griever sees his future from the present such that the 
beloved never will again be here or there— present and future. The common 
expression of  sympathy or condolence in the English language, “I’m sorry 
for your loss,” gets this right, since it recognizes the absence as present for 
the griever— and indeed the griever’s future present.
We now can return to consider some additional phenomenological rea-
sons why we might say that grief  does not even depend upon memory or the 
past remembered. I do not only mean that we can and do grieve a present, 
or a future, that we believe likely will, but has not yet, come to pass (for 
example, as when we worry about a loved one undergoing a serious surgery, 
or being treated for a serious illness). However, my account of  grief  could 
accommodate such “anticipatory” grief  in which we do not know what to 
expect, and in which we agonize in the present over imagining the worst 
future in anticipatory grief. The pain of  grief  accompanies the present reali-
zation about a future grasped with certainty as a future world without X. The 
pain of  grief  is not just that X is not here in the present— as “Pierre is not in 
the café.” The pain of  grief  is that X is not here in the present as henceforth 
never again to be here. It is this fi nality, it is this knowledge of  the future as 
unalterably without X, that causes grief  in all its poignancy. If  someone alive 
is not here in person, but we have reason to believe we will see them again, 
then we do not grieve, even if  we are sorry. But if  someone for whom we 
care deeply (such that they factor centrally into our well- being) is here, or not 
here, and if  we have reason to believe we will never see that beloved person 
alive again, then we grieve, since we can imagine that time to come. My wife, 
I think, grieved each time we left her grandmother who lived outside of  Paris. 
She grieved twice before she grieved one last time. And each time it was grief  
over someone still alive and not yet irrevocably lost, but nevertheless reason-
ably believed to never be seen again, since she would be lost before we would 
return. She imagined, in a mode of  expectation, her grandmother justifi ably 
as no longer existing, or as soon to be deceased, and the affects that well up 
indicate grief, and no mere sorrow— and certainly not mere sentimentalism, 
insofar as that future imagined seems reasonably anticipated. This is perhaps 
 26 As Solomon’s own example implies, before he reduces absence to the past— 
the past remembered— the absence that grief  apprehends is an absence in the now, 
an absence in the present and henceforth, which means he should have said that 
grief  notices that he or she is not here spatio/temporally and will not be there again 
temporally (instead of  not here).
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why we say things such as, “I never expected her to live this long.” This reac-
tion is not the kind of  sorrow that she expresses when her mother leaves San 
Diego and returns to New York, which sorrow has its discomfort; rather, it 
is a sorrow that is adjusted by the hope that consoles her despite her sorrow, 
a hope that grief  excludes. Sorrow can have a very different apprehension of  
the future because it can have a very different sense of  expectation.
More to the point of  why we should resist the reduction of  grief  to its 
behavior or experience— and yet not lose the ability to accommodate that 
feature of  grieving— is that we are not grieving about the memories them-
selves, because the memories themselves are not lost. In fact, the memories 
themselves are not painful (even though the griever might feel pained that 
the memories are henceforth all she has left). One way to bring the point 
into greater relief  is to contrast grief  to one of  its characteristic modes of  
expression— namely, regret. I think the moments of  regret that often accom-
pany grieving are likewise founded on this futural meaning of  grief. Regret, 
properly speaking, is both caused by a past action (or failure to act) and takes, 
as its object, that past action (or failure to act) in a modalized, memorial act. 
Regret is both caused by and about the past act or failure to act; the act or 
failure to act in the past marks both the temporal orientation and the tempo-
ral meaning of  regret. Grief, in contradistinction, is not a past- directed emo-
tion in this sense, and when the griever regrets, that regret is an expression 
of  grief. What the griever’s regret expresses is motivated by the present and 
futural temporal meaning of  grief. When a griever regrets not having spent 
enough time with X, or not having cherished X, or not having told X one 
last time that he loved her, his regret emerges only because the normal pos-
sibility to execute such actions has been disrupted— permanently— as of  the 
loss— henceforth. Such regret in grief  is not regret properly speaking, but is 
an expression of  grief  and grief ’s apprehension of  the world in the now as 
“now and in the future” a world that henceforth no longer offers these pos-
sibilities. Moreover, we can and do grieve— precisely as a part of  the grieving 
process— the lack of  memories we have about that profoundly loved, but 
now irreversibly lost, X. In this instance, grief  is not at all about the present 
referred to the past, but rather about the inability to remember enough about 
the past as the past causes more grief  (perhaps guilt, as Solomon I think 
rightly suggests) (S, 86).
In short, remembering is an expression of  grief  and not that about 
which we grieve. It is in this sense, and only in this memorial expression of  
grief, that grief  intends the past; grief  intends the past expressively, but is 
not about the past. Thus, it is easy to see why it is commonly thought that 
grief  is past directed: so much of  what the griever does is remember or 
attempt to remember. But that very effort implies the meaning of  the present 
and the future sense of  grief, insofar as the effort to generate the memories 
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refl ects the griever’s attempt to hold fast before the henceforth and refl ects 
an unreadiness to put the past before oneself; nevertheless, that very pro-
cess of  remembering the deceased reveals a griever who has implicitly put 
the past before himself  precisely insofar as he otherwise would not exert 
himself  thusly. The pain of  that taking of  someone as past in memories is 
grounded in the henceforth— that is, in the realization that that loved some-
one or something can only ever be had henceforth in the particular mode of  
absence in the past, because that loved someone or something henceforth 
never again will appear except as past. Without the sense that we never again 
can “see” the loved someone or something (except as past); without the sense 
that the future is a future without exception as a world no longer with the 
beloved, there is no grief. In this sense, the temporal meaning or signifi cance 
of  grief  is the present and the future oriented by the past event— the event 
of  the passing— that is henceforth before the griever.
Grief ’s Temporal Meaning: Putting the Past before Us as Future
Outside the refuge of  the temporally indexed past world of  memories, the 
griever experiences this world, this life, here, now, henceforth as a world that 
no longer has X in it.27 The griever grieves when seeing the world as a world 
no longer with X only on the condition that he profoundly loved X, and 
takes X as lost, which thereby gives full meaning to this absence now, in the 
present, as painful. This relates to the way the future manifests in the notion 
of  the lost, in the paradigm case of  grief. The world given to the grieving 
agent as a world no longer having X in it is certainly the world in which X has 
been lost to the agent. But it is also (crucially) the world given as bereft of  
X for all future times (in the griever’s life). Regardless of  the behaviors and 
expressions of  grief, the griever experiences the impossibility of  “seeing” X 
again as impossible, as an unrealizable desire. It is the fi nality, the certainty 
of  it being impossible to see them again in this life that makes grief  grief  
and turns the griever’s present, whenever he is not dwelling in the refuge of  
memory, into a poignant swath of  absence. The how of  the givenness of  the 
world for the griever is the world given now as bereft of  X, or no longer hav-
ing X in it. This is a world where the “no longer” points to the future and not 
the past— that is, the world is not just a world where X no longer exists (i.e., 
is past)— but it is also a world as a world no longer with X, now, at present, 
 27 That alone, however, does not constitute grief. The present mode of  the griev-
er’s world is not just the world as not having X in it. That description alone refl ects 
something like hunger or injustice or waiting or disappointment (or even relief  when 
something tormenting us goes away).
GRIEF: PUTTING THE PAST BEFORE US174
and in the future. Indeed, the world given to the griever, as a world not having 
X in it, appears with such resonance, poignancy, or intensity because it is a 
world given as now never again having X in it or as now henceforth no longer 
having X in the future.
The experience of  the world as no longer having X in it is obviously not 
like an experience of  some task construed as impossible. The griever does 
not take the impossible as impossible in the way that we take time- travel, 
or coming to the end of  pi as impossible.28 Both sorts reveal hopelessness, 
of  course, but in these latter examples there is no emotional connection or 
commitment (unless we manipulate the scenario to include, in a contrived 
way, a person intently committed to these endeavors— which would, in any 
case, probably produce disappointment in the end, but not grief). These 
more ordinary senses of  taking the impossible as impossible do not include, 
as does the paradigm case of  grief, the loss of  something that was loved and 
to which one was committed and therefore possessed and now has lost and 
henceforth will never have again. As the unnamed man claims in Cormac 
McCarthy’s The Road, “the never to be differs from the never was.”29
That the meaning of  grief  is rooted in the griever being directed toward 
the future can be seen in a way as most pitiable, if  we realize how ordinary 
is the future directedness of  grieving. The griever intends the future just as 
one intends any ordinary mode of  expectation. What expectation expects is 
something as actual, not as possible. Expectation thus lives the experience 
“as actually going to occur.”30 As a matter of  the fl ow of  time, expectation is 
just a reliable belief  characterized as a straightforward and unbroken taking 
of  the future— that is, a seeing with a thorough look, ex- spectare, the taking of  
which renders the future closed.31
Grief, in the worst sense, has its extraordinariness, of  necessity, converted 
into ordinariness, or folded into our ordinary orientation to the future, in expec-
tation. This seems like a calamity of  life, one of  life’s great cruelties— that grief  
should be so utterly ordinary. But if  the griever is reconciled to the loss of  that 
profoundly loved X, his grief  always lives in expectation, always has his expec-
tations fulfi lled. In a world as a world without X henceforth, Pierre will not be 
at the café— ever, again. It is not Pierre’s present absence at the café that is at 
issue in grief. In disappointment or anger or worry or sorrow, Pierre is absent 
in the sense of  missing, as not having turned up. In grief, Pierre is absent in 
the sense of  lost, as never again to turn up. The difference between sorrow 
and grief  over the deceased also rests on the future in this way. The former will 
 28 A. Steinbock, Moral Emotions, 187.
 29 Cormac McCarthy, The Road (New York: Knopf, 2006), 27.
 30 A. Steinbock, Moral Emotions, 163.
31 Ibid.
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neither hope for nor expect anything because the deceased does not bear inti-
mately on the sorrower going forward, and this because the deceased did not 
fi gure centrally and profoundly on the well- being of  the sorrower (i.e., she was 
not that important to him). The latter, too, will not hope, but he will not hope 
because he expects to see the absence of  his beloved everywhere, for as long 
as he grieves. His view of  the future is lived as closed— as he expects— just as 
my view of  the future, in the mode of  expectation, is lived as closed insofar as 
I expect there to be presents under the tree on December 25 and income tax 
returns to be fi led on April 15. Indeed, the griever knows that his expectation 
will be fulfi lled with more certainty than I expect these events, or others, such 
as that the postman will arrive in the early afternoon, or that my car will turn 
over when I need to head to work tomorrow, or even that Monday will follow 
this Sunday.32 Of  all these forms of  expectation, the griever is most certain to 
have his expectations fulfi lled— that is, he does not just live this experience as 
actual rather than possible, but he lives this experience as actual because its 
opposite is actually no longer possible.
The griever’s expectation that Pierre will not be at the café will be ful-
fi lled even before (and then, of  course, when) the griever arrives at the café. 
The café, in turn, will appear to the griever not as a place of  pleasure, joy, 
and refuge (presuming it was those things previously), but one of  misery, 
suffering, and affront. The café will appear as a café without Pierre, for-
ever, and will be a particular reminder of  the new world that is a swath of  
absence, indeed, a swath that will range to all places familiarly lived with 
Pierre, whose absence will even make the home seem as empty as the book 
that indicated to Nussbaum the absence of  her mother. The expectation 
that this is a world as no longer having X motivates that sense of  an absence 
that pervades the present everywhere. As Augustine writes, “Whatever I 
looked upon had the air of  death. My native place was a prison- house and 
my home a strange unhappiness. The things we had done together became 
sheer torment without him. My eyes were restless looking for him but he 
was not there. I hated all places because he was not in them.”33 To be a bit 
loose phenomenologically, what is pitiable is that the griever will be disap-
pointed in having his expectation fulfi lled— or, to put it differently, there is 
no empty- intention in grief  because the object of  grief  is always an empty- 
intention that we know will be in principle unfulfi llable (at least in this life). 
In grief, our expectation is always already fulfi lled.
The griever’s world reduces to mere expectation, whereas it formerly 
may have been dominated by expectation without excluding anticipation. 
 32 Ibid.
 33 Augustine, Confessions, translated by Frank J. Sheed (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub-
lishing, 2006), IV/4: 9.
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This shift occurs because there is no longer an openness to the future regard-
ing the world without X. Anticipation, at least as I understand it in the ordi-
nary language sense of  the English expression, conveys less certainty than 
expectation, and at least does not live with a closed sense of  regard toward 
the future. If  protention is a prefi guring, it is not a predicting or saying in 
advance in the way that expectation does not just surmise or prefi gure but 
says something in advance about what the future will be. The saying in expec-
tation need not be explicit or propositional, but it is a saying with certainty. 
Anticipation is like a prefi guring and like an expectation insofar as it lives 
in a more determinate mode than the former (protention pre- fi guring) but 
a less determinate mode than the latter (expectation pre- dicting). Anticipa-
tion, as an action of  looking forward to without a determined sense, is lost 
to the griever, paradigmatically with respect to the deceased. Anticipation 
has a sense of  preparing for or forestalling something that differentiates it 
from the strong belief  that something will happen or be that way. As a taking 
possession beforehand, or ahead of  time, anticipation lives in openness or 
indeterminateness such that we can say, “I didn’t anticipate having to use my 
umbrella” or “I don’t know what to expect, but I’m really anticipating tomor-
row’s party,” or “so- and- so is expecting,” but not anticipating. But Pierre will 
never show up at the café; the griever cannot anticipate it (not in and for this 
life, anyhow). Such is the reduction of  the world for the griever to a swath 
of  absence that always remains fulfi lled as an unfulfi llable, empty intention. 
Perhaps this is why grievers often say that it “just doesn’t seem real,” although 
the loss is lived as actual, rather than merely as possible, even if  it does not 
seem that way. In grief, there is nothing to anticipate, until time does its work 
again as Augustine notes, “Time came and went from one day to the next; 
in its coming and its passing it brought me other hopes and other memories, 
and little by little patched me up again with the kind of  delights which had 
once been mine, and which in my grief  I had abandoned. The place of  that 
great grief  was slowly taken . . . by the seeds from which new griefs should 
spring . . . At any rate, the comfort I found in other friends . . . did much to 
repair and remake me. And it was all one huge fable, one long lie.”34
Epilogue
The griever, seeing the world as a world in which his deep love fi nds its object 
no longer, puts the past before, in front of, himself. If  there is an object that 
grief  takes, it is the absence of  the beloved henceforth. One could perhaps 
take my suggestion that we can capture grief  by accounting for its temporal 
 34 Ibid., IV/8: 13.
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meaning or signifi cance on analogy with a thrown projection. As thrownness 
denotes a full awareness of  those uncontrollable and limiting conditions into 
which we have been born, we might consider grief  a second thrownness in 
which we once again enter the world anew— and wailing. To avoid confu-
sion, perhaps we should speak of  grief  in this analogy as a “tornness” that 
denotes the lover/griever’s full awareness of  the uncontrollable circumstance 
of  fi nding oneself  torn from a central and profound source of  meaning that 
he’d fashioned through her, with her, and in her (his beloved). This torn- 
griever must remake his concerns in a new set of  uncontrollable and limiting 
circumstances. As thrownness denotes the full ontological category of  hu-
man life wherein one fi nds oneself  enmeshed in a pre- structured world of  
meaning that is beyond one’s control and yet with which one must tarry, the 
“tornness” of  grief  could suggest being thrown back into that pre- structured 
world in which meaning must once more be constituted anew in light of  the 
fact that the griever has been torn from the world that the griever fashioned 
and cultivated through her, with her, and in her. This would mean that “torn-
ness” arrives with a more acute awareness and intensity than that found in 
thrownness. One fi nds oneself  as “thrown” in a world in which nothing is 
yet lost even if  all is limiting; but the griever fi nds himself  as “torn” from his 
familiar world and at once thrown back into that pre- structured world where 
all again is limiting but now the limits emerge from the loss of  someone 
deeply loved, the loss of  the central and profound source of  meaning now 
no- longer. The griever lives a life in a world in which he needs once more to 
make his way after having had removed from his world of  fashioned com-
mitments the one though whom, in whom, and with whom he had fashioned 
those commitments. The temporal meaning of  grief  that clarifi es the ob-
ject of  this emotion and explains its characteristic painfulness and poignancy 
is the henceforth— “the temporalizing that temporalizes itself  as a future 
which makes present in a process of  having been.”35
 35 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward S. 
Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 401.
